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Abstract. Pseudorandomness is a classical model for the security of block ciphers. In this paper we propose conve-
nient tools in order to study it in connection with the Shannon Theory, the Carter-Wegman universal hash functions
paradigm, and the Luby-Rackoff approach. This enables the construction of new ciphers with security proofs under
specific models. We show how to ensure security against basic differential and linear cryptanalysis and even more
general attacks. We propose practical construction schemes.
1 Introduction
Conventional encryption is used in order to enforce condentiality of communications in a network. Following the
Kerckhoffs principles [34], schemes are dened by three public algorithms: a key generation scheme, an encryption
scheme, and a decryption scheme. Two parties willing to communicate condentially can generate a private key which
is used as a parameter for encryption and decryption. Here encryption and decryption are formalized as functions
 
and  , respectively, such that 
 

	 for any message  .
In 1949, Shannon formalized the notion of secrecy [59]. He formally proved the unconditional security (in his
security model) of the Vernam Cipher which had been published in 1926 [71]. Unfortunately, this scheme happens to
be quite expensive to implement for networking because the sender and the receiver need to be synchronized, and they
need quite cumbersome huge keys. Shannon’s result also proves that unconditional security cannot be achieved in a
better (i.e. cheaper) way. For this reason, empirical security seemed to be the only efcient alternative, and all secret
key block ciphers which have been publicly developed were considered to be secure until some researcher published
a dedicated attack on it. Therefore research mostly advanced like a tennis game between designers and analysts.
In the 70s the U.S. Government used to be far ahead of academic research on cryptography. By releasing the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) [2] without development rationales, this paradoxically boosted research on block ciphers
as researchers were trying to reverse engineer or attack the design of DES. Real advances on the attack strategies on
block ciphers were made in the early 90s when Biham and Shamir invented differential cryptanalysis and applied it
against DES [7,8,9,10]. The best version of this attack can recover a secret key with a simple  -chosen plaintext
attack.1 Although this attack is heuristic, experiments conrmed the results. Biham and Shamir’s attack was based
on statistical cryptanalysis ideas which were later used by Gilbert and Chass·e against another cipher [15,16]. Those
ideas inspired Matsui who developed a linear cryptanalysis on DES [41,42]. This heuristic attack, which has been
implemented, can recover the key with a  -known plaintext attack. Since then, many researchers tried to generalize
and improve these attacks (see, for instance, [22,27,29,31,35,36,37,48,61,62]), but the underlying ideas were quite the
same.
The basic idea of differential cryptanalysis is to use properties like if  and  are two plaintext blocks such that
	ﬁﬀ , then it is likely that
 
ﬂﬃ	
 
 !ﬁ" .
2 Then the attack is an iterated two-chosen plaintexts attack
which consists in getting the encrypted values of two random plaintexts which verify 	#$ﬀ until the special event
 
ﬂ%	
 
&" occurs. Similarly, linear cryptanalysis consists in using the probability ')(+*
 
 ﬃ,.-0/213.,.-546
for two given hyperplanes - 4 and - / . With the 798#:; -vector space structure, hyperplanes are half-spaces, and this
probability should be close to <31= . Linear cryptanalysis exploits the distance between this probability and <>1= when
it is large enough. More precisely, linear cryptanalysis is an incremental one-known plaintext attack where we simply
measure the correlation between the events * ,?- 4 6 and *
 
 #,@-
/
6 .
Cryptanalysis is not restricted to destructive purposes. It also has a positive side on which the analyst tries to prove
the security of cryptographic schemes. Unlike the negative aspects which can be purely intuitive (there is no need
1 Previously, the best known attack was an improvement of exhaustive search which required on average A=BDC DES computations
by using the complementation property.
2 Here E denotes the bitwise exclusive OR function. However, this technique can be extended to any other group law.
for proving that an attack works if we can experiment it successfully), the positive aspects require more formal and
systematic results.
Instead of breaking or proposing new encryption functions, Nyberg rst formalized the notion of strength against
differential cryptanalysis [50]. Similarly, Chabaud and Vaudenay formalized the notion of strength against linear crypt-
analysis [12]. With this approach, we can study how to make internal computation boxes resistant against both attacks.
This can be used in a heuristic way by usual active s-boxes counting tricks (e.g. see [22,23]). This has also been used
to construct the PURE cipher for which we can prove the security against both attacks (see Nyberg and Knudsen [52]),
but in an unsatisfactory way which introduces some algebraic properties which lead to other attacks as shown by Jakob-
sen and Knudsen [26]. The Nyberg-Knudsen approach was later used by Matsui in practical block ciphers including
MISTY and KASUMI [1,43,44].
Another approach in order to study the security of block ciphers was introduced by Luby and Rackoff in 19883 [40].
They have shown how to formalize security by pseudo-randomness and how to prove the security of the underlying
DES construction  the Feistel scheme [14]  provided that round functions are totally random. As for the Shannon
result, this suffers from the expensive cost of random bits, and basically requires having an enormous private key. We
can still use derandomization techniques, like the Carter-Wegman method [11,73] for sampling pairwise independent
numbers. This leads us to the notion of decorrelation which enables measuring the pseudo-randomness with small
keys and studying how it protects against attacks.
Inspired by Carter and Wegman, we use simple primitives which we call NUT (for  F -Universal Transformation)
since they are so cheap to implement. We propose construction methods for block ciphers that we call COCONUT
(for Cipher Organized with Cute Operations and NUT), PEANUT (for Pretty Encryption Algorithm with NUT),
and WALNUT (for Wonderful Algorithm with Light NUT). Our construction is based on a theory which mixes all
previous results and happens to offer new ways of investigation for research on block ciphers.
1.1 Related Work
Several researchers concentrated on the positive side of cryptanalysis: security arguments. Usually block cipher de-
signers try to upper bound the probability of the best differential or linear characteristics in ad-hoc ways. Some results
apply to multi-path characteristics like Nyberg-Knudsen [51,52], Aoki-Ohta [3], Keliher et al. [32,33], and Park et
al. [53,54].
In another approach, Luby-Rackoff [39] and Maurer-Massey [45] studied the security of product ciphers.
One of our purpose is to quantify the security against ciphers when a limited number G of samples are available,
starting from the seminal work Luby-Rackoff [40] related to Feistel schemes [14]. Some extensions investigated the
security with higher values of G , e.g. Patarin [56], and Maurer-Pietrzak [46]. Many other researchers have applied the
same techniques to other schemes. (See, for instance, [19,24,25,30,47,49].)
Our work studies provable security against specic models of attacks. We addressed the basic differential and
linear cryptanalysis and the more general model of iterated attacks which are based on a (low) specic number G of
plaintext/ciphertext samples. Our work was further extended by Junod [28] with techniques using statistics.
Some papers related to the theory presented in this article are collected on [66].
1.2 Structure of this Article
The paper is organized as follows. First we give some denitions on decorrelation (Section 2) and basic constructions
for NUTs (Section 3). Then we investigate connections to Shannon’s perfect secrecy notion (Section 4). We show how
to express security results in the Luby-Rackoff security model (Section 5). We prove how pairwise decorrelation can
protect a cipher against basic differential and linear cryptanalysis (Sections 6.1 and 6.2). We generalize those results
with the notion of iterated attacks of order G  (Section 6.3). Then we apply decorrelation upper bounds to practical
constructions such as Feistel Ciphers (Section 7). Finally, we dene the COCONUT, PEANUT and WALNUT families
(Sections 8.1 and 8.2).
1.3 Notations
In what follows we use the following notations:
3 An earlier version was presented at the CRYPTO ’85 conference.
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H : composition of two functions: I HKJ is a function which maps  onto IL J M ,
N
: set of real numbers,
798#O= : nite eld with O elements,
PRQ
: set of all sequences which consist of G elements of a set
P
,
SUTWVWX
: advantage of a distinguisher Y (see Section 5),
<+Z : variable which is set to 1 if the predicate [ is satised or to 0 otherwise,
\
'!]2ﬀ^"_ : differential probability of a function ` with characteristic ﬀ^"a (see Section 6.1),
b
'!]+cﬀ^"a : linear probability of a function ` with characteristic ﬀ^"a (see Section 6.2).
We represent all random variables by capital letters. They are associated to a probability distribution which will be
clear from the context. For instance, d may denote a random variable and 'K(+* de	fW6 may represent the probability
that it takes a given value  .
Given nite sets g and h , a real matrix i of type g.jh is dened by an array of real numbers whose row indices
and column indices run in g and h respectively. We let N0kmlWn denote the set of all these matrices. The term in row o
and column p is denoted i%qr s . In Section 2.4 four norms tut iﬃtut / , vﬃw?cix , tutut iytztut w , and tzt iﬃtut { of the matrix i will be
dened.
Random functions or permutations will be considered. They will be represented by random variables, e.g. | or
 
.
Section 2.1 denes the matrix * |%6
Q
or *
 
6
Q
for any positive integer G . Random functions or permutations with ideal
distributions will be denoted with a star superscript as |~} or
 
} .
2 Decorrelation
2.1 Block Ciphers, Random Functions, Distribution Matrices
In what follows, we consider ciphers as random permutations
 
on a message-block space
P
. Since we are consid-
ering block ciphers, and for simplicity reasons, messages are considered as elements of
P
which is assumed to be a
nite set. In most of practical cases, we have
P
	2^_<== . We emphasize on
 
being a random permutation. Here
the randomness comes from the random choice of the secret key. In particular, for any (xed) permutation ` over P ,
there is a probability 'K(+*
 
	ﬁ`6 that the
 
instance is equal to ` .
Definition 1. Given a random function | from a given set P 4 to a given set P / and an integer G , we dene the
G -wise distribution matrix * |%6
Q
of | as a P Q
4
j
P
Q
/
-matrix where the m^W -entry of * |%6 Q corresponding to the multi-
points $	f4=^__+_^M Q 
,
PRQ
4
and ~	f43^+___^ Q #,
PRQ
/
is dened as the probability that we simultaneously have
|
q
!	
q for o&	Ł<;^+_+a^MG . We denote it * |%6 Q
r 
	')(2* 

6 .
Basically, each row of the G -wise distribution matrix corresponds to the distribution of the G -tuple | 4 ^+_+_^M| Q 
where  4 ^+___^ Q  corresponds to the index of the row. Intuitively, every experiment (or attack) on   with G samples
will provide some information on some simultaneous equations
 
q	;q . The experiment probability will thus
correspond to a cell in the *
 
6
Q
matrix.
2.2 Perfect Decorrelation
The G -wise distribution matrix of a random function intuitively denes its G -wise decorrelation. There is no precise
denition of decorrelation, only ways to compare some, and models for perfect decorrelation. Two random functions
have the same G -wise decorrelation if, and only if their G -wise distribution matrices are equal.
A random function (or a random permutation) will be compared with an ideal version of it which will have to be
specied. Then, we will be able to compare the decorrelations of the function (or permutation) with its ideal version.
For example, a block cipher
 
over
P
is compared with the ideal block cipher
 
} over
P
which is dened to be a
random permutation over
P
with uniform distribution. Note that for
P
	>W^+<== , we need z
/
:=ﬃ Kﬁ@= bits
in order to specify fully an instance of
 
} , which is enormous. If
 
and
 
} have the same decorrelation to the order
G , we say that the G -wise decorrelation of the cipher
 
is perfect.
Similarly a random function | from
P
4 to
P
/ is compared with a uniformly distributed random function |y}
from
P
4 to
P
/ . We say that the G -wise decorrelation of the random function | is perfect if | and |~} have the same
G -wise decorrelation.
3
Let | be a random function from
P
4 to
P
/ . Saying that the function | has a perfect 1-wise decorrelation means
that for any  4 the distribution of | 4  is uniform.
Saying that the function | has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any 4	/ the random variables
|4_ and |/> are uniformly distributed and independent. This is exactly the notion of strongly universal / function
as dened by Carter and Wegman [73].
Saying that a cipher
 
on
P
has a perfect 2-wise decorrelation means that for any 4y	ﬁ/ , the random variable

 
 42^
 
/2M is uniformly distributed among all the  4>^M;/+ pairs such that 40	;/ . This is exactly the notion of
pairwise independent permutation as dened by Carter and Wegman [73].
2.3 Decorrelation Distance
The previous section provides a qualitative way to compare decorrelations. Here we introduce a quantitative way to
do the same.
Definition 2. Given two random functions | and ¡ from a given set P 4 to a given set P / , an integer G and a
distance  over the matrix space N$¢¤£¥2lW¢£¦ , we call * |%6
Q
^+* ¡%6
Q
 the G -wise decorrelation  -distance between |
and ¡ . When ¡ is the ideal version of | and is clear from the context we call M* |%6 Q ^+* ¡%6 Q  the G -wise decorrelation
 -bias of | .
A decorrelation distance of zero means that for any multi-point $	 4 ^__+_^M Q  the multi-points | 4 ^+_+_^M| Q 
and ¡ 4 ^+_+_^M¡ Q M have the same distribution, so that | and ¡ have the same decorrelation.
2.4 Classical Distances
For the purpose of our treatment, we dene the § / norm, the innity weighted pseudo-norm vw , the §!w -associated
matrix norm tutzt¨ﬂtztut w , and the tzt¨©tut { -norm4 on N
¢£¥>l ¢¤£
¦ by:
tzt iﬃtut
/
	
ª «

r 
i

r 3
/ (1)
v
w
ix!	¬­3®

r 
t i

r 
t
')(2* 0¯L°

±6
(2)
tztut iﬃtutzt w²	¬­3®

«

t i

r  t (3)
tut iytzt {³	¬­3®

¥
«

¥
__M¬­3®

£
«

£
t i

r  t (4)
where
 
} is the Perfect Cipher, ´	µ 4 ^_+__^M Q %,
PRQ
4
, and $	µ 4 ^+__+^ Q %,
PRQ
/
. For Equation (2) we use the
convention that 13	 and `213 is undened for `5	f . Thus the vw is not always dened. We can check that it is
always dened when i	¶*
 
4
6
Q·
*
 
/
6
Q
for any random permutations
 
4 and
 
/ . Hence vyw still denes a distance
in order to compare decorrelation of permutations.
We recall properties of matrix norms. First, tzt¨©tut / , tutzt¨ﬂtztut w , and tzt¨©tut { are norms, which means that
1. tut iytzt±	 if and only if i is the identically zero matrix,
2. tut ¸¹ iytzt	ºt ¸Lt¨ﬂtzt iﬃtut for any real number ¸ ,
3. tut i¼».½tut¾tzt iﬃtut+»¿tut ½$tzt .
The latter property is the triangular inequality. We easily check these properties for tutÀﬂtzt / , tztut¨©tutzt w , and tut¨©tut { . In
addition, these are matrix norms, which means that we have the extra property (called multiplicativity)
4. tut ij?½tut¾tzt iﬃtut¨©tut ½$tzt whenever we can make the matrix product ij$½ .
This property is quite well known for tutÀﬂtut / and tututÀﬂtztut w .5 We prove it for the tzt¨ﬂtzt { norm.
4 This norm was first introduced in [69].
5 It comes from the Cauchy-Schwarz property for Á¨Á ÂzÁÀÁ Ã and from the link ÁÀÁ¨Á ÄxÁ¨ÁÀÁ3Å¤ÆÈÇaÉÊ2ËÌÍÎ Î Ï Ê Î Î
Î Î
Ê
Î Î
with a vector norm for ÁÀÁÀÁ ÂuÁÀÁÀÁ Ð .
4
Lemma 3. Given two matrices iŁ,
N$¢£¥ lW¢£
¦
and ½, N0¢¤£¦ l ¢¤£Ñ , we have tut ij$½$tzt {Ò¾Łtzt iﬃtut {©tut ½tut { .
Proof. We prove it by induction on G . For G~	Ł< this is simply the result on the tztut¨©tutzt w norm.
Given  49,
P
4 and ±4x,
P
/ , we dene Ó  ¥ r  ¥ cix#,
N0¢
£Ô
¥
¥
lW¢
£Ô
¥
¦ by
Ó

¥
r 
¥
i%aÕ

¦
r×Ö×Ö×Ö r

£Ø
r
Õ

¦
r×Ö×Ö×Ö r 
£Ø
	i
Õ

¥
r×Ö×Ö×Ö r

£Ø
r
Õ

¥
r×Ö×Ö×Ö r 
£Ø

We notice that
tut iytzt { 	¬­=®

¥
«

¥
tzt Ó

¥
r 
¥
cix+tzt { 
We similarly dene Ó  ¥ r Ù ¥ ½ﬃ and Ó  ¥ r Ù ¥ i¿j½ﬃ . We have similar observations for tut ½$tzt×{ and tzt ij½tut { . Obviously
we have
Ó

¥
r Ù
¥
cij?½ﬃ)	
«

¥
Ó

¥
r 
¥
i%#jÓ
¥
r Ù
¥
½y
Using the triangular inequality and the induction hypothesis, we have
tut ifj$½$tzt { ¾Ú¬­3®

¥
«
Ù
¥
«

¥
tut Ó

¥
r 
¥
i%_tut { ﬂtut Ó 
¥
r Ù
¥
½ﬃ+tzt { 
By considering matrices in N¢
¥
lW¢
¦
and N¢ ¦ l ¢ Ñ whose terms are the tzt Ó  ¥ r  ¥ cix_tut { and tut Ó ¥ r Ù ¥ c½ﬃ_tut { values we
notice that this expression is yet another tztutÀﬂtutzt×w norm of a matrix product. Hence
tzt ij?½tut {Ò¾ÜÛ ¬~­=®

¥
«

¥
tut Ó

¥
r 
¥
ix+tzt {>ÝÛ¬­3®

¥
«
Ù
¥
tut Ó
¥
r Ù
¥
½ﬃ+tzt {>Ý
which is nothing but tzt ij?½tut { ¾Łtzt iﬃtut { ©tut ½$tzt { . Þß
We also recall properties of distances. A distance  is such that
1. ciÈ^M½yK	ﬁ if and only if iﬁ	½ ,
2. ciÈ^M½yK	ﬁ½0^Mix ,
3. ciÈ^
 
à¾ÚciÈ^½ﬃm».½0^
 
 .
Matrix norms dene distances by ciÈ^M½y	µtut i
·
½tut . We easily check that vw denes a distance on distribution
matrices of ciphers as well.
In [69] the tzt¨©tut á norm is introduced. It is used in order to study super-pseudorandomness whereas tzt¨ﬂtzt¨{ is used in
order to study randomness. For simplicity we omit it in the paper, but we put discussion of it in Appendix B.
2.5 Multiplicativity of Decorrelation Distances
Theorem 4. Let
 
4
^_+_+^
 
â
be independent ciphers over
P
. We consider
 
	
 àâ
H
+_
H
 
4 the product cipher. We
let
 
} be the perfect cipher over P . For the distance  dened by either tzt¨ﬂtzt / , tztutÀﬂtutzt w , tut¨©tut { , or vyw we have
M*
 
6
Q
^+*
 
}
6
Q
#¾
â
ã
quä
4
*
 
q6
Q
^+*
 
}
6
Q

It will be shown that the distance  characterizes the weakness of a cipher. Hence this theorem means that the weak-
ness is multiplicative in a product cipher. This property makes the decorrelation bias of ciphers a multiplicative com-
binatorial measurement for those distances. It is quite convenient to prove the amplication phenomenon in product
ciphers.
Proof. By induction we only need to prove it for åÈ	ﬁ . Let   4 and   / be two independent random permutations over
P
. We notice that *
 
/
H
 
46
Q
	f*
 
46
Q
j¤*
 
/_6
Q
.
For any o we notice that
 
q
H
 
} ,
 
}
H
 
q , and
 
} have the same distribution. Hence we have *
 
q
H
 
}6
Q
	
*
 
}
H
 
q6
Q
	f*
 
}a6
Q
.
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From those observations we notice that
*
 
/
H
 
4 6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
	*
 
4 6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
#j¤*
 
/ 6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
a
We recall that the tzt¨ﬂtzt / , tutzt¨ﬂtztut w , and tzt¨©tut { norms are matrix norms, i.e. tut ij$½$tzt ¾Łtut iytzt¨ﬂtzt ½tut . Therefore
tut¨*
 
/
H
 
46
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tzt¾tut¨*
 
46
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tut¨©tut¨*
 
/a6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tzt
for those norms. We easily check that we have a similar property for the v5w distance. Þß
3 Decorrelation Modules
The aim of this section is to provide cheap and efcient decorrelated random functions or permutations. We call them
NUT, for F -Universal Transformations in order to remind us of the Carter-Wegman notion of universal function and
to emphasize their low cost.
3.1 NUT-0: Perfect 1-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Group
Perfect 1-wise decorrelation is easy to achieve with permutations when the message-block space
P
is given a group
structure. We let » denote the group law in
P
. We can use
 
?	æ@»¿ç where ç is a uniformly distributed
random key on
P
, which is exactly the Vernam Cipher [71]. This primitive plays an important role in the construction
of block ciphers, e.g. in order to construct Markov ciphers (see Lai-Massey-Murphy [37]) or in the Nyberg-Knudsen
construction [52].
3.2 NUT-I: Perfect Decorrelated Functions over a Finite Field
Perfect decorrelated functions are easy to construct when P is given a nite eld structure. We can take |5	
ç
4
»Łç
/
@»Łç


/
»¶+_»ç
Q

Q+è
4
where çé	êç 4 ^+_+_^Mç Q  is a uniformly distributed random key on
PëQ
.
This random function has perfect G -wise decorrelation due to the Lagrange interpolation principle. This builds perfect
decorrelation functions to arbitrary orders. Perfect decorrelated permutations to arbitrary orders are much harder to
construct.
3.3 NUT-II: Perfect Pairwise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
We can construct perfect pairwise decorrelated ciphers on a eld structure
P
as well by
 
 U	Łç4K»¼ç5/;  where
çæ	cç4>^ç5/+ is uniform in
P
j
P
} .
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3.4 NUT-III: Modulo ì -Based Pairwise Decorrelated Functions for the í³î Norm
On the standard space
P
	ï>W^+<=3 , our previous construction requires implementing arithmetic on the nite eld
798#c;% , which may lead to a poor encryption rate on software for large  . We can take advantage of built-in integer
multiplication by approximating the previous construction. The decorrelation is no longer perfect though.
Theorem 5. Let | K	ç 4 »ç /  5¬~
T%ð for ð 	f< ·ñ ; prime and ç 4 ^Mç / independent uniformly distributed
random variables in
P
	>W^+___^;
·
<= . We assume that <31<+ò0ó
ñ
ó¿ . | is a random function from P to P .
Let |Ò} be a uniformly distributed random function from P to P . We have tztz* |%6 / · * |Ò}6 / tut / ¾ô  ñ .
The proof is given in [65].
Note that the pairwise tztutÀﬂtutzt w -decorrelation of this primitive is pretty bad since the distribution of | 4 ^| / 
is odd when  4 	 / »
ð
: we always have | 4 )	ﬁ| /  . We can however use this primitive in order to amplify the
decorrelation of random cipher in the sense of the § / norm and still obtain provable security bounds.
6 Here õ²ö denotes the set of all non-zero field elements.
6
3.5 NUT-IV: Modulo ì -Based Decorrelated Functions for the ÷÷uøù÷c÷×ú Norm
Here instead of taking
ð
smaller than  as in the previous construction, we take
ð
larger than ± .
Theorem 6. Let |!	fcç 4 »@ç / U»@ç


/
»¤+_»@ç
Q

Q+è
4
¬~
Txð
¹¬~
T
; for ð 	f<m» ñ ; prime, ñ ó¼ , and
ç 4 ^__+a^Mç
Q independent uniformly distributed random variables in P 	µ2^__+^± · <; . | is a random function
from P to P . Let |ﬃ} be a uniformly distributed random function from P to P . We have tut¨* |%6 Qﬃ· * |Ò}6 Q tzt {Ú¾
WMù<!»
ñ

QU·
<> .
This theorem generalizes to any nite eld 798#
ð
 with
ð
not necessarily prime, and any
P
when using any injective
representation from
P
to 798#
ð
 for  and the ç q ’s and using any surjective mapping from 798# ð  to P instead of
the modulo ; reduction. (See Theorem 7 of [69].)
The proof of this theorem requires materials from Section 5. We provide it in Appendix A.
Note that a similar construction has been previously used by Halevi and Krawczyk for authentication in the MMH
algorithm [21].
3.6 NUT-V: 3-Wise Decorrelated Permutations over a Finite Field
A similar way to construct (almost) perfect 3-wise decorrelated permutation on a eld structure P is by    5	
ﬀ»~"_1 L»y`_ where çæ	fﬀ^"3^M`_ with "Ò	 . (By convention we set <313³	 .) We can prove that tut¨*   6 · *   }6ﬂtut { ¾¶ûü
where O is the eld cardinality, with the same techniques as for Theorem 6. (See [4].)
4 Links to the Shannon Secrecy Theory
4.1 Perfect Secrecy and Decorrelation
Shannon denes security by the notion of perfect secrecy [59]. Perfect secrecy is a property of a cipher and a random
plaintext source. We say that
 
provides perfect secrecy for a given distribution of d if -.d01
 
d´)	-ýd´ where
- denotes the Shannon entropy,7 or equivalently if d and
 
d´ have independent distributions. We can also consider
ciphers
 
which provide perfect secrecy for any distribution of d . This means that the distribution of
 
 does not
depend on  .
In Shannon’s formalism, d denotes the full stream of plaintext that we want to encrypt whereas d denotes one
plaintext block in our approach. We usually bring the two approaches together by considering
 
as a one-time cipher
which encrypts a single plaintext (big) block.
Obviously, if
 
is a perfect 1-wise decorrelated cipher, then
 
provides perfect secrecy for any plaintext source
since
 
  is uniformly distributed for any  . The Vernam cipher (see Section 3.1) is an example.
We easily capture the notion of a chosen plaintext or ciphertext attack with the following generalization.
Theorem 7. Let
 
be a cipher with a perfect G -wise decorrelation. For any  4 ^_+_a^M Q+è 4 , if d is a random variable
such that dþ	q , then
-ýd01
 

4
^+__+^
 

Q+è
4
^
 
d´MK	-.d´a
This means that if an adversary knows G
·
< pairs q^
 
qDM (either by a chosen plaintext or ciphertext attack), for
any  Q which is different from all
 
 q ’s, his knowledge of
 yè
4

Q
 is nothing more than knowing that it is different
from all  q ’s.
Proof. From the denitions, straightforward computations show that for any random variable d we have
-ýd01
 

4
a^__+_^
 

Q+è
4
a^
 
dK	ﬁ-ýd»
ð
u;
/
ð
^
where
ð
	ﬁ')(2* dþ	qMßo&	Ł<;^+_+_^MG
·
<_6 . Since we know that our d is different from all q we have
ð
	 . Þß
7 We recall that by definition  ÒÅ	
  Åﬀ
Ã
 þÅ with the convention that ﬁﬂ
Ã
ﬁÅﬃﬁ , and that
  "!#Å$ &%'! ( !) where  &%*!) is the entropy of the joint variable +¤Å,&%*!) .
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4.2 Key Length Lower Bound
The Shannon approach enables proving a lower bound on the private key length for ciphers which achieve perfect
secrecy for any plaintext source. More precisely, the Shannon Theorem proves that if
 
provides perfect secrecy for
any distribution of the plaintexts over
P
, then -ý
 
%óu;
/.-
P
. This means that the key parameter in
 
needs to
have at least u;
/ -
P
bits to be at least as long as the plaintext. The Vernam cipher achieves the equality case.
We can prove a similar result for perfect decorrelation.
Theorem 8. If | is a random function from P 4 to P / with perfect G -wise decorrelation (for G¾
-
P
4 ), then
-ýc|È$óGu;
/ -
P
/ . If   is a cipher over P with perfect G -wise decorrelation, then -ý   ?óGu;
/ -
P ·
G
/
1
-
P ·0/
cG
/
1
-
P
 as G 1
-
P
decreases toward zero.
Proof. Let 4=^_+_a^M Q be G pairwise different points in P 4 . Since | has a perfect G -wise decorrelation, then 1ë	
| 4+^+__+^M|
Q
 is uniformly distributed in
PæQ
/
. Hence we have -.21ﬃ%	¶GMz
/ -
P
/ . Due to the property of
joint entropy we have -ý|#^31ﬃﬃó-ý41Ò . However, | fully determines 1 hence -ýc|#^51y9	µ-ý|È , thus -.|Èﬃó
Gu;
/ -
P
/ .
For ciphers we do the same. 1 happens to be uniformly distributed among all multi-points with pairwise different
entries. We have v 	
-
P

-
P ·
<2 +__
-
P ·
G~»<> values which is greater than 
-
P ·
G±
Q
. We obtain
-ý
 
#ó.u;
/
vëóÚGu;
/

-
P ·
G± . Hence
-ý
 

óGMz
/6-
P
».GMz
/
7
<
·
G
-
P98

The result then comes from zù<
·;:
)	
·<:%·0/

:
 . Þß
5 Security against Distinguishers with Limited Oracle Accesses
In the Luby-Rackoff model [40], an attacker is an innitely powerful Turing machine Y= which has access to an oracle
>
. Her aim is to distinguish a cipher
 
from the Perfect Cipher
 
} by querying the oracle with a limited number G
of inputs. The oracle
>
implements either
 
or
 
} . The attacker must nally answer 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). We
measure the ability to distinguish
 
from
 
} by the advantage
SUTWVX
	t
ð
·
ð
}t where
ð (resp. ð } ) is the probability
of accepting
  (resp   } ), i.e. the probability of answering 1 if > implements   (resp.   } ).
5.1 ? -Limited Distinguishers and @$A -Decorrelation
Since we put no upper bound on the computational capability of the distinguisher (the only limitation is on the number
of queries to the oracle), we can assume without loss of generality that the best one is fully deterministic. Hence it can
be dened by functions I±4>^+___^I Q and an acceptance set Y as illustrated in Fig. 1.
Parameters: functions B"C%ÂÂÂ3%DBFE , a set G
Oracle: a permutation H
1: select a fixed message  C ÅIB C 2 and get ! C ÅJHﬂ C 
2: calculate a message  Ã ÅKB Ã !LCD and get ! Ã ÅJHﬀ Ã 
3: ÂÂÂ
4: calculate a message  E#ÅIBEM! C %ÂÂÂ3%*!NEO
C
 and get !NE#ÅJHﬀ Eﬀ
5: if !Å,! C %ÂÂÂ3%*!NEﬀ6PQG , output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 1. A General R -Limited Distinguisher.
Theorem 9. Let G be an integer, and let
 
be a cipher. For any distinguisher between
 
and the perfect cipher   }
which is limited to G queries (as depicted in Fig. 1), we have
SxT VNSUT V
Ö
4x¾v
w
*
 
6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q

where the vyw norm is dened by Equation (2).
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In particular, we have unconditional security when the decorrelation is perfect and we still have a proven quantied
security when the decorrelation is small.
Proof. Obviously we have
ð
	
«
XW
X
'K(+*  ¯

±6
where ¼	e 4 ^__+_^M Q  and ¿	  4 ^__+a^ Q  with qÒ	RI3q 4 ^+__+^;q è 4  in the sum. Since ')(+* æ¯ 6³¾ ù<x»
:
 ')(2* 5¯
°

±6 with
:
	vyw?*
 
6
QU·
*
 
}a6
Q
 , we have
ð
¾Łù<!»
:

«
XW
X
'K(+* 0¯
°

±6 	f<!»
:

ð
}
so we have
ð · ð
}%¾
:
for any attacker. We can apply this result to the attacker which produces the opposite output to
show that t
ð · ð
}=t ¾
:
. Þß
5.2 Best Non-Adaptive Distinguisher and ÷÷c÷zøù÷c÷÷ A -Decorrelation
Here is a more precise theorem in the non-adaptive case. We call a distinguisher non adaptive if no d q queried to
the oracle depends on some previous answers 1s (see Fig. 2).
Theorem 10. Let G be an integer and
 
be a cipher. The best G -limited non-adaptive distinguisher (as depicted in
Fig. 2) for   is such that
SxT VYST V
Ö
/U	
<

tutztz*
 
6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tztut
w
where the tutzt¨ﬂtztut w norm is dened by Equation (3) and   } is the perfect cipher.
Parameters: values 
C
%ÂÂÂZ%*)E , a set G
Oracle: a permutation H
1: select some fixed messages Å,[C%ÂÂÂ%' E 
2: get !Å,Hﬂ[C55%ÂÂÂZ%*Hﬀ Eﬂ*
3: if !\PQG , output 1, otherwise, output 0
Fig. 2. A R -Limited Non-Adaptive Distinguisher.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by 	º 4 ^+___^ Q  and Y . With the notations of Theorem 9, we have
ð
	
«

<
XW
X
'K(^]©
¯

_
^
thus, we have
SUTWV
	a`
`
`
`
`
«

<+"W
Xcb
')(
]
ﬁ¯


_
·
'K(
]
0¯
°


_ed
`
`
`
`
`

Looking for the best distinguisher thus consists of maximizing this expression over all possible choices for  and Y .
We can easily see that this maximum is obtained when Y consists of all  ’s such that 'K( ]© ¯ _
·
'K(f]u
¯
°

U_ have
the same sign. Since the full sum for all  is zero, the sum of all positive terms is equal to the sum of negative terms,
hence half of the sum of all absolute values. Hence for the best distinguisher
SUT V
	¬~­=®

<

«

`
`
`
')(
]

¯


_
·
'K(
]

¯
°


_
`
`
`

We can recognize here the tztutÀﬂtutzt w distance between *
 
6
Q
and *
 
}6
Q
. Þß
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5.3 Best Adaptive Distinguisher and ÷÷uøù÷c÷ ú -Decorrelation
We can extend Theorem 10 and get a more precise result than Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. Let G be an integer and let
 
be a cipher. The best G -limited distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 1) for  
is such that
SUT V SUT V
Ö 4 	
<

tztz*
 
6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tzt {
where the tutÀﬂtut { norm is dened by Equation (4) and   } is the perfect cipher.
This motivates the introduction of the tutÀﬂtut { norm.
Proof. The best attack is fully characterized by I4>^+__+^I Q and Y . As for Theorem 10, for the optimal distinguisher
we have
SxT V
	
<

«

`
`
*
 
6
Q

r 
·
*
 
}
6
Q

r 
`
`
with q	ﬁI3q 4 ^__+a^q è 4  . By maximizing this expression in terms of I 4 ^_+_a^I Q we obtain
SUT V
	
4
/
tztz*
 
6
Q±·
*
 
}6
Q
tzt { .
Þß
6 Resistance against Iterated Attacks
Since resisting against general G -limited distinguishers for G large costs too many bits of randomness in the private
keys (as Theorem 8 says), we can wonder how useful this theory is for practical ciphers. In this section we investigate
some particular class of distinguishers which capture many of the existing attack methods. We show that decorrelation
with low degree is enough to resist them.
6.1 Differential Cryptanalysis
In this section we assume that
P
is given a group structure of order g . (Typically we consider P 	Ł2W^+<= and the
XOR group law.) We study the security of pairwise decorrelated ciphers against basic differential cryptanalysis.
Let
 
be a cipher on
P
and let
 
} be the Perfect Cipher.
Most differential cryptanalysis of å -round block ciphers based on the Biham and Shamir attack (see [9,10]) use a
simple distinguisher between å
·
o rounds (for o!	²< , 2, or 3) of the cipher and the perfect cipher. This distinguisher
uses a xed pair ﬀ^"a
,
P
/
with ﬀ@	ﬁ and is depicted in Fig. 3.
Parameters: a complexity h , a characteristic iN%*jZ
Oracle: a permutation H
1: for k from 1 to h do
2: pick uniformly a random  and query for Hﬂ and HﬀmlniU
3: if HﬂolpiUÅJHﬂqlpj , output 1 and stop
4: end for
5: output 0
Fig. 3. Differential Distinguisher.
We dene
\
'
¯
cﬀ^"a)	ﬁ')(
r
*
 
dï».ﬀ K	
 
d´m»¼"6:^
where d has a uniform distribution. It is well known that differential cryptanalysis depends on this quantity (see, for
instance, [50]). This quantity depends on the choice of the cipher (i.e. on the key). Here we focus on average com-
plexities of attacks with no prior information on the key.8 For this we concentrate on the average value sut
\
'
¯
cﬀ^"aDv
8 The problem of successful attacks for sets of weak keys is not our purpose here.
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over the distribution of
 
. We rst mention that sut
\
'
¯
ﬀ^"aDv has an interesting linear expression with respect to the
pairwise distribution matrix of
 
. Namely, straightforward computation shows that
s5
\
'
¯
ﬀ^"aK	
<
g
«
w
¥Zx
w
¦
y
¥ x
y
¦
<
w
¦3z
w
¥|{}
y
¦3z
y
¥|{~
')(
]
 4 ^M /  ¯

 4 ^M / 
_
 (5)
Lemma 12. For the distinguisher of Fig. 3 between   and the perfect cipher   } over the group P of order g we
have
SUT VNST V
Ö

¾¼F&M¬~­=®
7
<
g
·
<
^5s t
\
'
¯
ﬀ^"a v
8

Proof. It is straightforward to see that the probability ð
]
, for some xed oracle ` , that the attack accepts ` is
ð
]
	<
·
M<
·
\
'
]_cﬀ^"a5%^
which is less than F&
\
' ] ﬀ^"a
. The probability that it accepts
 
is
ð
	s0
ð
¯
?¾ F& st
\
'
¯
cﬀ^"aDv . Since from
Equation (5) we have s b \ '
¯
°
ﬀ^"a|d@	
4

è
4
, we obtain the result. Þß
Theorem 13. Let
 
be a cipher on a group
P
of order g and let   } be the perfect cipher. For any basic differential
distinguisher between
 
and
 
} (depicted in Fig. 3) of complexity F , we have
SUTWVNSUT V
Ö

¾
F
g
·
<
»
F

tutztz*
 
6
/
·
*
 
}
6
/
tutut w 
Note that this result holds for differential cryptanalysis with any group law and captures the notion of multi-path
differential.
Proof. We rst consider the distinguisher with F?	f< . It is a non adaptive distinguisher limited to two queries. Due to
Theorem 10, this is less than 4
/
tztutz*
 
6
/
·
*
 
}a6ùtztut
w . As in the proof of Lemma 12, we obtain that it is further equal to
`
`
`
`
st
\
'
¯
cﬀ^"a5v
·
<
g
·
<
`
`
`
`

Thus
st
\
'
¯
ﬀ^"_Dv9¾
<
g
·
<
»
<

tztutz*
 
6
/
·
*
 
}
6ùtztut w$
We conclude by using Lemma 12. Þß
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of <31Fg , basic differential cryptanalysis cannot work against
 
unless its complexity reaches the order of magnitude of g .
6.2 Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis has been invented by Matsui [41,42] based on the notion of statistical attacks which are due to
Gilbert et al. [15,16,60]. As for differential cryptanalysis, we study here the underlying distinguisher against å · o
rounds for small o .
In this section we assume that
P
	2^_<=3 . The inner dot product ﬀ;" in >W^+<=3 is the parity of the bitwise
AND of ﬀ and " .
Let
 
be a cipher on
P
and let
 
} be the Perfect Cipher.
As in Section 6.1, we similarly call the basic linear distinguisher the distinguisher characterized by a pair cﬀ^"a
,
P
/
with "?	µ which is depicted in Fig. 4. We notice here that the attack depends on the way it accepts or rejects
based on the nal counter ¸ value.
As pointed out by Chabaud and Vaudenay [12], linear cryptanalysis is based on the quantity
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"a)	
b
&')(
r
* d+ﬀy	
 
d´6+"6
·
<
d
/

(Here we use Matsui’s notations taken from [43].) As for differential cryptanalysis, we focus on st b '
¯
cﬀ^"a5v , and
there is a linear expression of this mean value in terms of the pairwise distribution matrix *
 
6
/
which comes from
straightforward computations as shown by the following lemma.
11
Parameters: a complexity h , a characteristic iN%*jZ , a set G
Oracle: a permutation H
1: initialize the counter value  to zero
2: for k from 1 to h do
3: pick a random  with a uniform distribution and query for Hﬂ
4: if u3i9ÅJHﬂZj , increment the counter 
5: end for
6: if &PQG , output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 4. Linear Distinguisher.
Lemma 14. Given a random permutation
 
over >W^_<;3 , for any ﬀ and " , we have
s0
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"_K	¿
è
/

«
w
¥ x
w
¦
y
¥ x
y
¦

·
<2
Õ

¥|Ł

¦
Ø'
{
Õ

¥|Ł

¦
Ø' 
'K(f]D 4 ^ /  ¯

 4 ^ / '_
	f<
·

/
è
/

«
w
¥
z
w
¦
y
¥
z
y
¦
<
w
¥3 }
z
y
¥Z ~
w
¦
 }ﬀ
z
y
¦
 ~
'K( ]  4 ^M / 5¯

 4 ^ /  _ 
If   has a uniform distribution, ﬀ 	 , and "y	 , we have s0 b '
¯
cﬀ^"a#	
4
/3
è
4
. Note that s5
b
'
¯
W^"a#	 for
"Ò	 .
Proof. In order to prove it, we rst notice that )')( r * dﬃﬀ~	   d´a"6 · <x	st · <> r  {
¯
Õ
r
Ø' :Ø
v , and we express
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"_ as
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"aK	s
b

·
<2
Õ
r
¥
Ł
r
¦
Ø'
{
Õ
¯
Õ
r
¥
Ø
Ł
¯
Õ
r
¦
ØØ' 
d
where d4 and d/ are independent uniformly distributed random variables. We have
s5
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"aM)	ﬁ
è
/

«
w
¥
x
w
¦
y
¥Zx
y
¦

·
<>
Õ

¥|Ł

¦
Ø'
{
Õ

¥|Ł

¦
Ø' 
')(f]D 4=^/>
¯

±4>^M;/+*_

The contribution of terms for which  4 	 / is equal to 
è
 . Considering that
 
is a permutation we can concentrate
on 4	/ and ±45	;/ . Then we split the remaining sum into four groups depending on the two bits 4^2ﬀ³¼±4<
">^M/2ﬀ%ý;/+"a . Let 

¥
r

¦ be the sum of all probabilities for which the two bits are :"243^"/2 ,  4ﬃ	/ , and 4Ò	;/ .
We have
s5
b
'
¯
ﬀ^"aM)	ﬁ
è

»¼
è
/

)
r

·

è
/

)
r
4
·

è
/

³4
r
!».
è
/

³4
r
4>
Due to symmetry we have   r 4à	o³4 r  . Furthermore, the sum of the four sums is Ò:=
·
<> . Hence
s5
b
'
¯
cﬀ^"aM)	ﬁ
è

»¼
è
/

j@

c

·
<2
·
òj?
è
/

)
r
4
which leads to our second result. Computations when
 
is uniformly distributed are straightforward. Þß
Lemma 15. For the distinguisher of Fig. 4 we let ð
]
be the probability that the output is 1 given an oracle ` . We let
ð
 be the probability that it outputs 1 when the counter is incremented with probability 4
/
in each iteration instead of
querying the oracle. We have
t
ð
]
·
ð

t¾Y F&
b
'K]2ﬀ^"_
Furthermore, the maximum for t ð
]
·
ð

t is asymptotically equivalent to 4
/3

F&
b
'
]
cﬀ^"a when F increases and
b
'!]+cﬀ^"a)	
/

4

 .
Proof. We rst express the probability ð
]
that the distinguisher accepts ` . Let vyq be the random variable dened as
being 1 or 0 depending on whether or not we have d+ﬀ5	¿`=d62" in the o th iteration. All vq ’s are independent and
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with the same 0-or-1 distribution. Let  be the probability that v~qm	f< . We also dene Ò	¿e
·
<x	

b
'K]2ﬀ^"a . We
thus want to prove that t
ð
]
· ð
 t¾Úe
ô
F . We have
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
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
We would like to upper bound t
ð
]
· ð
 t over all possible Y depending on  . Since  and <
·
 play a symmetric role
we assume without loss of generality that ~ó 4
/
. For Ò	 4
/
, the result is trivially true, so from now on we assume that
&
4
/
. Since   ù<
·
±

è
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where  is the least integer ¸ such that the difference in parentheses is nonnegative, i.e.
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Replacing ¸ by
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in the same expression in parentheses we obtain a negative difference. Hence ó
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replacing ¸ by F&  , the expression in parentheses turns out to be an increasing function in terms of  which is 0 for
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We use the following identity taken from [58].9
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9 We can easily prove it by derivating it in terms of ° .
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holds since the right-hand side of the inequality is greater than 1 and the left-hand side is a difference between two
probabilities. This proves the upper bound.
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Lemma 16. Let
 
be a cipher on
P
	º2^_<;> . For any linear distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 4) between   and
the ideal cipher
 
} we have
SUT V ST V
Ö

¾
¥
Ñ
¼
F& smt
b
'
¯
cﬀ^"aDv!»
¥
Ñ
¹
F


·
<

Proof. We rst notice that the advantage is zero when ﬀ	¶ or "Ò	¶ , so the bound holds. Let us now assume that
ﬀ	Ł and "	Ł . We now take a random permutation
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with the corresponding ½ and
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as in the previous lemma.
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Theorem 17. Let
 
be a cipher on
P
	Ł2^_<=3 . For any linear distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 4) between   and
the ideal cipher
 
} of complexity F we have
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from Lemma 14. We conclude by using the previous lemma. Þß
So, if the pairwise decorrelation bias has the order of 
è
 , linear distinguishers do not work against
 
unless its
complexity reaches the order of magnitude of ± .
6.3 Non-Adaptive Iterated Attacks of Order ?
Theorems 13 and 17 suggest that we try to generalize them to distinguishers in the model depicted in Fig. 5 as proposed
in [67]. In this model, we iterate a G -limited non-adaptive distinguisher Â . We assume that this distinguisher obtains
a sample d ^51ﬃ with de	d 4 ^_+_+^d Q  and 1	²21 4 ^+_+a^51 Q  such that ;q)	Ł`=dq: for a given distribution of d .
Thus, we can think of a known plaintext attack where d has a plaintext source distribution (e.g. a uniform distribution)
or of a chosen plaintext attack where d has a given distribution (e.g. in differential cryptanalysis, dR	d 4 ^d 4 ».ﬀ 
where d04 has a uniform distribution). The result of the attack depends on the result of all iterated ones in a way
characterized by a set Y . For instance, if Y	f>W^_<;

\ ±^_+_a^ we can dene the differential cryptanalysis (thus
of order G 	 ). If Y is the set of all 
©
4>^+_+_^
©

 with an acceptable sum we can dene the linear cryptanalysis (of
order Gﬃ	f< ).
One may believe that a cipher is resistant to this model of distinguisher once it has a small G -wise decorrelation
bias. This is wrong as the following example shows. Let
 
be a cipher with a perfect G -wise decorrelation. We
assume that an instance ` of
 
is totally dened by G points q^qc so that
 
is uniformly distributed in a set of
15
Parameters: a complexity h , a distribution on  , a test Ã , a set G
Oracle: a permutation H
1: for k from 1 to h do
2: pick Å, C %ÂÂÂ%* Eﬀ at random
3: get !Å,Hﬂ[C55%ÂÂÂZ%|Hﬀ E *
4: set ÄqÅÅ 0 or 1 with an expected value ÃÆ&%'!Ç
5: end for
6: if ÈÄ C %ÂÂÂZ%*ÄqÉU³P&G output 1 otherwise output 0
Fig. 5. Non-Adaptive Iterated Attack of Order R .
?	g4g
·
<2__+4g
·
G³»¿<2 permutations denoted ` 4 ^_+__^` . From d 	µd 4 ^_+_a^Md Q  and 1	µ21 4 ^+__+^51 Q 
we can dene Êd^51y as the unique index p such that `s;d~qDK	1q for o&	<^__+a^MG . We let
Â5d^51Ò!	Ë
<ÌÎÍÏÊd^31ÒÑÐ9¬~
TQÒ
9eÓ3ÔYÕ_(3ÖÌØ×5Õ
for a given modulus
Ò
	F13ﬀ and
Yº	2^_<;

\ ±^_+_a^±
If we feed this attack with
 
or
 
} , we have
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for ﬀÛÚþF respectively. Thus
SUT V
can be large even with a relatively large F . This problem actually comes from the
fact that the tests Â provide a same expected result for
 
and
 
} but a totally different standard deviation.
As a more concrete counterexample we can consider
 
as the NUT-II decorrelation module over
P
	798#c 9
which achieves perfect decorrelation to the order G.	Ü . We can consider a kind of differential-linear attack as an
iterated attack of order G	 which queries random pairs d 4 ^Md /  with a xed difference d 4 Úd / 	¶ﬀ and take
Ü
q equal to one bit "±c`=d 4 ¹Ú`=d / M . Then we take Y	¶±^_+_a^^2ù<^__+a^_<> . Due to the NUT-II structure, Ü q
is a constant bit thus
ð
	< , but
ð
}9 ×
è
 so the advantage of the distinguisher is close to 1. This simple example
extends into a real attack due to Biham et al. [6] against the COCONUT98 cipher [64].
We can however prove the security when the cipher has a good decorrelation to the order ;G and an extra assump-
tion about the distribution of d in every iteration.
Theorem 18. Let
 
be a cipher on a message space of size g such that tutztz*   6 / Q9· *   }a6 / Q tztut w ¾ : for some given
G5¾g1= where
 
} is the perfect cipher. Let us consider a non-adaptive iterated distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 5)
of order G between   and   } of complexity F . We assume that the distinguisher generates sets of G plaintexts of
independent and equal distribution in all iterations. We have
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where
ñ
is the probability that any two different iterations send at least one query in common.
Note that this extra assumption on
ñ
makes sense when considering either known plaintext attacks or chosen plaintext
attacks with a sufciently large sample space. For instance, if the distribution of d is uniform, we have
ñ
¾
Q
¦

. If
dR	fd
4
^d
4
».ﬀ  with d 4 uniformly distributed, we have
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.
Proof. Let ½ (resp. ½%} ) be the probability that the test accepts d^   d´M (resp. d^   };d´ ), i.e.
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Let
ð (resp. ð } ) be the probability that the attack accepts, i.e.
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Since the Ü q are independent and with the same expected value ½ which only depends on
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The full sum over o	º^_+_a^MF is the derivative of the binomial expansion of 5»ù<
·


which is 1. Hence the
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we deduce that t I: _tm¾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The crucial point in the proof is in proving that t ½
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½³};t is small within a high probability. For this, we need
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The sum over all  and   entries with colliding entries (i.e. with some q	
s
) is less than ñ . The sum over all  and
  entries with colliding entries and no colliding  and  is less than G / 1>òg . The sum over all no colliding  and  
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This theorem proves that we need F	uò~ù<31
ô
:
 or F´	uòyDô gŁ to have a meaningful iterated attack. If we apply it
to linear cryptanalysis, this result is thus weaker than Theorem 17. It is however much more general.
Note that Theorem 18 could be extended with no assumption on
ñ
and with adaptive attacks as long as we upper
bound ç0æ½ }  .
7 Block Cipher Constructions
In the previous sections we have seen that it is enough to achieve a good decorrelation of low degree in order to resist
many practical attack models. Here we show how to construct practical ciphers with those properties.
7.1 Decorrelation of Feistel Ciphers
In this section, we assume that
P
	
P

/
where
P
 is a group. Thus we can consider Feistel Ciphers on
P
. We
recall the notation ó for Feistel schemes. Given functions I 4 ^+__+^I
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 and óÈ:a ô ^M ö )	º ö ^ ô  , as illustrated by Fig. 6.
Lemma 19 (Luby-Rackoff [40]). Let | 4 ^| / ^M|
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be three independent uniformly distributed random functions on P 
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and we compare it with the perfect
cipher
 
} . For any distinguisher Y between óÈc|)43^|/^M|

 and
 
} which is limited to G queries, we have
SUT VWX
¾
G
/
ô
-
P

Thus from Theorem 11 we have
tut¨* óÈ|
4
^|
/
^M|

6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tut {Ò¾
G
/
ô
-
P

The decorrelation tzt¨ﬂtzt { -bias of Feistel Ciphers can be estimated with the following lemma.
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Fig. 6. Feistel Scheme ý2B C %DB_Ãﬀ%DBFüF .
Lemma 20. Let |)43^+___^M|
â (resp. þ³4>^_+_+^5þ â ) be å independent random functions on P  such that tztz* | q 6 Q· * þ q 6 Q tzt { ¾
:
q ( o¹	f<;^+___^å ). We have
tut¨* óÈ| 4 ^__+_^|
â
D6
Q
·
* óÈ4þ 4 ^_+__^3þ
â
D6
Q
tut {Ò¾
:
4 »+_2»
:=â

Proof. Let   qà	ßóÈ4þ 4 ^_+__^3þxq^M|¹q  4 ^+__+^M| â  . We have    	uóÈ| 4 ^+_+_^M| â  and  
â 	ßóÈ4þ 4 ^_+__^3þ â  . Using the
triangular inequality we have
tztz* óÈ|&43^+___^M|
â
D6
Q
·
* óÈ2þ³43^+_+a^5þ
â
6
Q
tut
{
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â
«
qzä
4
tut¨*
 
q
è
46
Q
·
*
 
q
6
Q
tut
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
Let us prove that tut¨*
 
q
è
4
6
Q
·
*
 
q6
Q
tut {Ò¾Łtutz* |¹q6
Q
·
* þxq6
Q
tut { .
Using Theorem 11, we consider a distinguisher Y between
 
q
è
4 and
 
q with advantage 4
/
tztz*
 
q
è
4
6
Q&·
*
 
q6
Q
tut { . We
can construct a distinguisher

between |Lq and þ%q as follows:
1. we simulate the random þ 4 ^__+a^5þ%q è 4 ^M|¹q  4 ^_+_a^|
â
2. from an oracle
>
which implements a function on
P
 we construct an oracle which implements the cipher
óÈ4þ
4
^_+_a^3þxq
è
4
^
>
^M|¹q 
4
^+__+^M|
â

3. we run Y on this oracle.
Obviously this distinguisher between |Lq and þ%q has the advantage 4
/
tut¨*
 
q
è
4
6
Qy·
*
 
q6
Q
tzt { . Since the best possible
advantage is 4
/
tztz* |qc6
Qà·
* þ%q6
Q
tzt { , we obtain the result. Þß
By using Theorem 10, this lemma, the Luby-Rackoff Lemma, and the multiplicativity of decorrelation distances, we
obtain the following result.
Theorem 21. Let | 4 ^_+_+^M|
â
be å independent random functions on P  such that tztz* |¹q6 Q±· * |Ò}6 Q tzt {È¾ : ( o¹	<^_+_a^Må )
where |ﬃ} is a uniformly distributed random function on P  . We consider the cipher   	ßóÈc| 4 ^+__+^M| â  on P 	
P

/
and we compare it with the perfect cipher   } . Let ?ó
¥
be an integer. For any distinguisher Y between
 
and
 
} which is limited to G queries, we have
SxT V
X
¾
<

7

:
»
=G
/
ô -
P
8


We note that the result holds for practical Feistel schemes as long as rounds use independent subkeys and that we can
measure the decorrelation biases of round functions.
Proof. By using the simulation technique as in the lemma, we notice that the tutÀﬂtzt¨{ -decorrelation bias can only decrease
with the number of rounds. Hence the decorrelation bias of a  -round Feistel scheme is at most 
:
»
/
Q
¦
ô 
¢
. Next we
use the multiplicativity of the tut¨©tut { -decorrelation bias 	
â


times. We may have a few extra rounds, but this can only
make the decorrelation bias decrease. We nally use Theorem 11. Þß
We mention that there is a similar result for the tutÀﬂtzt / norm in [65].
19
7.2 Generalization
The construction of decorrelated Feistel schemes based on the Luby-Rackoff Theorem generalizes to arbitrary struc-
tures. We provide here a useful lemma taken from [70] which was freely adapted from Patarin’s coefcient - tech-
niques [55].
Lemma 22. Let G be an integer. Let | be a random function from a set P 4 to a set P / . We let  be the subset of
PRQ
4
of all 4=^__+_^M Q  with pairwise different entries. We let |y} be a uniformly distributed random function from P 4
to
P
/ . We know that for all ý, and , PæQ
/
the value * |ﬃ}6
Q

r 
is a constant
ð
ﬃ	²
-
P
/2
è Q
. We assume there
exist a subset 
PæQ
/
and two positive real values
:
4 and
:
/ such that
– t yt
ð
 ó¿<
· :
4
–  @, 0, * |%6
Q

r 
ó
ð
 ù<
·;:
/  .
Then we have tztz* |%6
Q·
* |Ò}6
Q
tzt {È¾
:
4 »¼
:
/ .
This lemma intuitively means that if * |%6
Q

r 
is close to * | } 6
Q

r 
for all  and almost all  , then the decorrelation bias of
| is small.
Proof. We use the characterization of tut¨©tut { -decorrelation bias in terms of best adaptive distinguisher by using Theo-
rem 11. We let Y be one G -limited distinguisher between | and |y} with maximum advantage. We can assume without
loss of generality that Y is deterministic and never sends the same query twice. The behavior of Y is thus determinis-
tically dened by the oracle responses ?	ï 4 ^_+__^M Q  . We let q denote the o th query dened by  4 ^_+__^M;q è 4 . We
let ?	 4 ^__+a^ Q  which is assumed to be in  . We let i be the set of all rejected ±q , i.e. for which Y outputs 0. It
is straightforward that
SUT V
X
	
·
«
XW
t
* |%6
Q

r 
·
* |
}
6
Q

r 
v

Next we have
SxT VWX
¾
«
y
ïð
y
ï
:
/
* |
}
6
Q

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»
«
y
ïð
y

ï
* |
}
6
Q

r 

The rst sum is upper bounded by
:
/ . For the second sum, we recall that all  q ’s are pairwise different, so * | } 6
Q

r 
is
always equal to
ð
 . This sum is thus less than
:
4 . Þß
As a rst application, here is a quite useful lemma.
Lemma 23. For a random uniformly distributed function |~} and a random uniformly distributed permutation   }
dened over 2^_<=3 , we have
tztz* |
}
6
Q
·
*
 
}
6
Q
tut
{
¾GcG
·
<2M
è


Proof. We use Lemma 22 with |	   } . We let  be equal to the set of all pairwise different outputs. We have
t ~t
ð

óﬁ<
·
GG
·
<>


è

which gives
:
4 . Since *
 
}a6
Q

r 
ó
ð
 , we can take
:
/
	 and apply Lemma 22. Þß
As an example of application we prove Lemma 19 in a few lines.
Proof (of Lemma 19). Following the Feistel scheme   	,óÈ|K4=^M|¹/;^|

 , we let

q
	4

q
^5
4
q


/
q
	

q
».|L4;2
4
q


q
	4

q
^5

q

We let s be the event that ±
q
	\
4
q
»|/±2
/
q
 and 
q
	\
/
q
»|

2±
q
 for all o&	<^_+_a^G . We have *
 
6
Q

r 
	')(2* s96 . We
now dene
¿	
4
^__+_^M
Q
aß oÑº¤p 

q
	

sﬁﬀ

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(This is a set of non-pathological outputs when computing *   6 Q
r 
.) We can easily check that  fullls the requirements
of Lemma 22. Firstly we have
t ~tó
7
<
·
GG
·
<>


è

¦
8


Q
^
thus we let
:
4	
Q Õ Q+è
4
Ø
/

è

¦
. Second, for ,ﬂ and any  (with pairwise different entries), we need to consider
*
 
6
Q

r 
. Let s / be the event that all  /
q
’s are pairwise different over the distribution of |)4 . We have
*
 
6
Q

r 
ó')(2* sﬃ1es
/
6>')(2* s
/
6:
For computing 'K(+* sﬃ1"s / 6 we know that ±
q
’s are pairwise different, as for the  /
q
’s. Hence ')(2* sﬃ1es / 6
	²
è

Q
. It is
then straightforward that 'K(+* s / 6
ó²<
·
Q Õ Q+è
4
Ø
/

è

¦ which we dene to be <
·$:
/ . We thus obtain from Lemma 22
that tutz*
 
6
Q%·
* |Ò}6
Q
tzt {¾Ł;GcG
·
<2
è

¦
. From this and Lemma 23 we thus obtain tut¨*
 
6
Q%·
*
 
}a6
Q
tut {¾=G
/

è

¦ for
G¾
4 

¦
. Since tzt¨ﬂtzt { is always less than 2, it also holds for larger G . Þß
This technique can be used for various applications. For instance, we can compare the decorrelation provided by
top-level schemes of the candidates to the AES standardization process. This has been done in [47]. It was also applied
to the Lai-Massey scheme (the construction of IDEA [36]) in [68]. This is used in Section 8.3.
8 Construction Examples
8.1 COCONUT: A Perfect Decorrelation Design
In this section we dene the COCONUT Ciphers family which are perfectly decorrelated ciphers to the order 2. It uses
the NUT-II decorrelation module.
The COCONUT Ciphers are characterized by some parameters ´^
ð
 where  is the block length, and
ð
is
an irreducible polynomial of degree  in 798àc (which denes a representation of the 798#c9 Galois Field). A
COCONUT Cipher of block length  is simply a product cipher
 
4
H
 
/
H
 

where
 
4 and
 

are any (possibly
weak) ciphers which can depend on each other, and   / is an independent cipher based on a 3 -bit key which consists
of two polynomials i and ½ of degree at most 
·
< over 798àc; such that i 	 . For a given representation of
polynomials into  -bit strings, we simply dene
 
/
K	ﬁiÈ y».½Ł¬y
T9ð

 
/ is thus the NUT-II decorrelation module.
Since
 
/ performs perfect decorrelation to the order 2 and since it is independent from
 
4 and
 

, any COCONUT
Cipher is obviously perfectly decorrelated to the order two. Therefore Theorems 13 and 17 show that COCONUT
resists basic differential and linear cryptanalysis.
One can wonder what
 
4 and
 

are for. Actually,
 
/ makes some classes of attacks provably impractical, but in a
way which makes the cipher obviously weak against other attacks. (   / is actually a linear function, thus although we
can prove it resists any attack with a parameter G?¾ﬁ , it is fairly weak against some attacks with G5	
¥
.) We believe
that all real attacks on any real cipher have an intrinsic order G : that is, they use the G -wise correlation in the encryption
of G messages. Attacks with a large G on real ciphers are naturally impractical, because the G -wise decorrelation can
hardly be analyzed since it depends on too many factors. Therefore, the COCONUT approach consists in making the
cipher provably resistant against attacks of order at most 2 such as differential or linear cryptanalysis, and heuristically
secure against attacks of higher order by real life ciphers as
 
4 and
 

.
Example 24. The COCONUT98 Cipher has been proposed in [64] with parameters þ	ﬃ=ò and ð 	²
û
x»Ú
44
»

/
»@x»ý< . Interestingly, this motivated Wagner to invent the boomerang attack [72] in order to break it. This attack
is an iterated attack of order 4 which uses pretty bad differential properties of
 
4 and
 

. Another attack was found by
Biham et al. [6] based on a non-adaptive iterated attack of order 2 (namely a differential-linear attack, see Section 6.3).
This shows that despite the COCONUT98 Cipher provably resisting any differential distinguisher as depicted in Fig. 3,
one must not neglect the intrinsic strength of
 
4 and
 

. The existence of attacks when using stronger
 
4 and
 

is
still an open problem.
For completeness, we mention that an extension of the COCONUT construction (called DONUT for Double
Operations with NUT) was proposed by Cheon et al. [13].
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8.2 PEANUT: A Partial Decorrelation Design
In this section we dene the PEANUT Ciphers family, which achieve an example of partial decorrelation. This family
is based on the NUT-IV decorrelation module.
The PEANUT Ciphers are characterized by some parameters ^å3^G^
ð
 . They are Feistel Ciphers with a block
length of  bits (  even) and å rounds. The parameter G is the order of partial decorrelation that the cipher performs,
and
ð
must be a prime number greater than   ¦ .
The cipher is dened by a key of 
â
Q
/
bits which consists of a sequence of å lists of G 
/
-bit numbers, one for each
round. In each round, the | function has the form
|K	
J
44> 
Q+è
4
»I/; 
Q+è
/
»+_3»I
Q+è
42 y»c
Q
¬~
T9ð
¬~
T


¦

where J is any permutation on the set of all 
/
-bit numbers.
From Theorem 21 with ~	
¥
we thus obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 25. Let
 
be a cipher in the PEANUT family with parameters ´^Må3^MG^ ð  . We have
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where
 
} is the perfect cipher.
When
ð
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¦
, the upper bound for tut¨*
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Q
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Example 26. We can use the parameters  	 ﬃ;ò , å³	ﬂ! , Gﬃ	¿ and
ð
	±
/
»<ﬂÞ . We obtain that tut¨*
 
6
/
·
*
 
}a6
/
tut
{
¾

è

û
. Therefore from Theorems 13 and 17 no differential or linear distinguisher can be efcient. The PEANUT98
Cipher has been proposed with these parameters in [64].
Example 27. In an earlier version of this work [63], we proposed a similar construction (called PEANUT97) based
on the NUT-III decorrelation module which uses prime numbers smaller than   ¦ . However, the result above does not
hold with the tzt¨©tut { norm, but rather with the tzt¨©tut / one. The drawback is that this norm has less friendly theorems for
constructing Feistel ciphers, and in particular we need more rounds to make the cipher provably secure. (See [65].)
Example 28. The AES candidate DFC was proposed based on the PEANUT construction (see [17,18,20]). Nominal
parameters are  	<>#" , å³	ﬂ" , Gﬃ	¿ , and
ð
	ﬁ
û

»<
¥
, so we have tutz*
 
6
/
·
*
 
}
6
/
tzt {È¾
è
4M4
Ý
.
8.3 WALNUT: An Alternate Design
The Feistel cipher is based on a round mapping dened by
®ôL^M®ö)

®ö#^M®ôý|®ö)a
The Feistel scheme benets the Luby-Rackoff lemma which enables building a PEANUT cipher with a provably low
decorrelation bias. Instead, we can use the Lai-Massey scheme on which IDEA relies and which is based on the round
mapping

ô
^
ö


%$~
ô
»ý|
ô
·

ö
a^
ö
».|
ô
·

ö
M
as illustrated by Fig. 7 where » is any group addition law,
·
is the corresponding subtraction, and $ is an ortho-
morphism for the group, i.e. a permutation such that   $~
·
 is also a permutation. As shown in [68], the
Luby-Rackoff lemma holds for this scheme as well with the same bound and same number of rounds. We can thus
construct the WALNUT cipher is the same way as the PEANUT cipher, but with the Lai-Massey scheme instead of
the Feistel one.
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Fig. 7. Lai-Massey Scheme.
9 Conclusion and Further Work
Decorrelation modules are cheap and friendly tools which can strengthen the security of block ciphers. Actually, we
can quantify their security against a class of cryptanalysis which includes differential and linear cryptanalysis. To
illustrate this paradigm, we proposed prototype ciphers PEANUT97 [63], COCONUT98 and PEANUT98 [64], and
DFCv2 [20].
One problem with the COCONUT, PEANUT, or WALNUT constructions is that they require a long key (in order
to make the internal random functions independent). In real-life examples, we can generate this long key by using a
pseudorandom generator fed with a short key, but the results on the security based on decorrelation are no longer valid.
However, provided that the pseudorandom generator produces outputs which are indistinguishable from truly random
sequences, we can still prove the security. This approach has been developed in [17,18,20] with the submission of
DFC to the Advanced Encryption Standard process.
Security against some other generic models of attacks is still open. In particular we may investigate security against
the Boomerang attack [72], the rectangle attack [5], or the linear-differential attack [6,38]. Although we can directly
use results from Section 6.3 with a high order of decorrelation it is not quite clear at this time what the minimal order
of decorrelation required is. Extensions of Theorem 18 to adaptive attacks is also open. It is further not quite sure that
=G -decorrelation is necessary for getting provable security against iterated attacks of order G , although we have proven
it is sufcient and that G -decorrelation is not.
It is further problematic to estimate the decorrelation bias of concrete ciphers like DES or AES candidates unless
we approximate them to an ideal model [47].
10 Acknowledgments
I thank the anonymous referees, Eli Biham, Ueli Maurer, David Wagner, and Thomas Baigneres for helpful com-
ments, as well as Pascal Junod for interesting discussions and a pointer to Equation (6). My gratitude also goes to my
co-authors from [17,18,20,57], Henri Gilbert, Marc Girault, Louis Granboulan, Philippe Hoogvorst, Phong Nguyen,
Fabrice Noilhan, Thomas Pornin, Guillaume Poupard, Jacques Stern, and from [4,47], Kazumaro Aoki and Shiho
Moriai.
References
1. ETSI. Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Specification of the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algo-
rithms. Document 2: Kasumi algorithm specification (3GPP TS 35.202 version 3.1.2 Release 1999).
http://www.etsi.org/
23
2. Data Encryption Standard. Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 46, U. S. National Bureau of Standards, 1977.
3. K. Aoki, K. Ohta. Strict Evaluation of the Maximum Average of Differential Probability and the Maximum Average of Linear
Probability. IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals, vol. E80-A, pp. 1–8, 1997.
4. K. Aoki, S. Vaudenay. On the Use of GF-Inversion as a Cryptographic Primitive. To appear in the Proceedings of SAC’03,
LNCS, Springer-Verlag.
5. E. Biham, O. Dunkelman, N. Keller. The Rectangle Attack — Rectangling the Serpent. In Advances in Cryptology EURO-
CRYPT’01, Innsbruck, Austria, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2045, pp. 340–357, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
6. E. Biham, O. Dunkelman, N. Keller. Enhancing Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT’02,
Queenstown, New Zeland, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2501, pp. 254–266, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
7. E. Biham, A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’90, Santa
Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 537, pp. 2–21, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
8. E. Biham, A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of DES-like Cryptosystems. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 4, pp. 3–72, 1991.
9. E. Biham, A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of the Full 16-Round DES. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’92, Santa
Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 740, pp. 487–496, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
10. E. Biham, A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
11. J. L. Carter, M. N. Wegman. Universal Classes of Hash Functions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 18, pp.
143–154, 1979.
12. F. Chabaud, S. Vaudenay. Links between Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’94,
Perugia, Italy, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 950, pp. 356–365, Springer-Verlag, 1995.
13. D. H. Cheon, S. J. Lee, J. I. Lim, S. J. Lee. New Block Cipher DONUT Using Pairwise Perfect Decorrelation. In Progress in
Cryptology INDOCRYPT’00, Calcutta, India, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1977, pp. 262–270, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
14. H. Feistel. Cryptography and Computer Privacy. Scientific American, vol. 228, pp. 15–23, 1973.
15. H. Gilbert. Cryptanalyse Statistique des Algorithmes de Chiffrement et Se´curite´ des Sche´mas d’Authentification, The`se de
Doctorat de l’Universite´ de Paris 11, 1997.
16. H. Gilbert, G. Chasse´. A Statistical Attack of the FEAL-8 Cryptosystem. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’90, Santa
Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 537, pp. 22–33, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
17. H. Gilbert, M. Girault, P. Hoogvorst, F. Noilhan, T. Pornin, G. Poupard, J. Stern, S. Vaudenay. Decorrelated Fast Cipher: an
AES Candidate. (Extended Abstract.) In Proceedings from the First Advanced Encryption Standard Candidate Conference,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Ventura, California, U.S.A., August 1998.
18. H. Gilbert, M. Girault, P. Hoogvorst, F. Noilhan, T. Pornin, G. Poupard, J. Stern, S. Vaudenay. Decorrelated Fast Cipher: an
AES Candidate. Submitted to the Advanced Encryption Standard process. In CD-ROM “AES CD-1: Documentation”, National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), August 1998.
19. H. Gilbert, M. Minier. New Results on the Pseudorandomness of Some Blockcipher Constructions. In Fast Software Encryp-
tion’01, Yokohama, Japan, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2355, pp. 248–266, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
20. L. Granboulan, P. Nguyen, F. Noilhan, S. Vaudenay. DFCv2. In Selected Areas in Cryptography’00, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2012, pp. 57–71, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
21. S. Halevi, H. Krawczyk. MMH: Software Message Authentication in the Gbit/second Rates. In Fast Software Encryption’97,
Haifa, Israel, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1267, pp. 172–189, Springer-Verlag, 1997.
22. H. M. Heys. The Design of Substitution-Permutation Network Ciphers Resistant to Cryptanalysis, Ph.D. Thesis of Queen’s
University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, 1994.
23. H. M. Heys, S. E. Tavares. Substitution-Permutation Networks Resistant to Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis. Journal of
Cryptology, vol. 9, pp. 1–19, 1996.
24. T. Iwata, K. Kurosawa. On the Pseudorandomness of the AES Finalists — RC6 and Serpent. In Fast Software Encryption’00,
New York, NY, USA, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1978, pp. 231–243, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
25. T. Iwata, T. Yoshino, T. Yuasa, K. Kurosawa. Round Security and Super-Pseudorandomness of MISTY Type Structure. In Fast
Software Encryption’01, Yokohama, Japan, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2355, pp. 233–247, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
26. T. Jakobsen, L. R. Knudsen. The Interpolation Attack on Block Ciphers. In Fast Software Encryption’97, Haifa, Israel, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 1267, pp. 28–40, Springer-Verlag, 1997.
27. P. Junod. On the Complexity of Matsui’s Attack. In Selected Areas in Cryptography’01, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 2259, pp. 199-211, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
28. P. Junod. On the Optimality of Linear, Differential and Sequential Distinguishers. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’03,
Warsaw, Poland, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2656, pp. 17–32, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
29. P. Junod, S. Vaudenay. Optimal Key Ranking Procedures in a Statistical Cryptanalysis. To appear in FSE’03.
30. J.-S. Kang, S.-U. Shin, D. Hong, O. Yi. Provable Security of KASUMI and 3GPP Encryption Mode f8. In Advances in Cryp-
tology ASIACRYPT’00, Brisbane, Australia, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2248, pp. 255–271, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
31. B. R. Kaliski Jr., M. J. B. Robshaw. Linear Cryptanalysis using Multiple Approximations. In Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO’94, Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839, pp. 26–39, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
32. L. Keliher, H. Meijer, S. Tavares. New Method for Upper Bounding the Maximum Average Linear Hull Probability for SPNs.
In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’01, Innsbruck, Austria, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2045, pp. 420–436,
Springer-Verlag, 2001.
24
33. L. Keliher, H. Meijer, S. Tavares. Improving the Upper Bound on the Maximum Average Linear Hull Probability for Rijndael.
In Selected Areas in Cryptography’01, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2259, pp. 112–128,
Springer-Verlag, 2001.
34. A. Kerckhoffs. La Cryptographie Militaire, Librairie militaire de L. Baudouin & Cie., Paris, 1883.
35. L. R. Knudsen. Block Ciphers — Analysis, Design and Applications, Aarhus University, 1994.
36. X. Lai. On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers, ETH Series in Information Processing, vol. 1, Hartung-Gorre Verlag
Konstanz, 1992.
37. X. Lai, J. L. Massey, S. Murphy. Markov Ciphers and Differential Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’91,
Brighton, United Kingdom, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 547, pp. 17–38, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
38. S. K. Langford, M. E. Hellman Differential-linear Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’94, Santa Barbara,
California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839, pp. 17–25, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
39. M. Luby, C. Rackoff. Pseudo-random Permutation Generators and Cryptographic Composition. In Proceedings of the 17th
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, Providence, Rhode Island, U.S.A., pp. 363–365, ACM Press, 1985.
40. M. Luby, C. Rackoff. How to Construct Pseudorandom Permutations from Pseudorandom Functions. SIAM Journal on Com-
puting, vol. 17, pp. 373–386, 1988.
41. M. Matsui. Linear Cryptanalysis Methods for DES Cipher. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’93, Lofthus, Norway,
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 765, pp. 386–397, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
42. M. Matsui. The First Experimental Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’94,
Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839, pp. 1–11, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
43. M. Matsui. New Structure of Block Ciphers with Provable Security against Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis. In Fast
Software Encryption’96, Cambridge, United Kingdom, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1039, pp. 205–218, Springer-
Verlag, 1996.
44. M. Matsui. New Block Encryption Algorithm MISTY. In Fast Software Encryption’97, Haifa, Israel, Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science 1267, pp. 54–68, Springer-Verlag, 1997.
45. U. M. Maurer, J. L. Massey. Cascade Ciphers: The Importance of Being First. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 6, pp. 55–61, 1993.
46. U. Maurer, K. Pietrzak. The Security of Many-Round Luby-Rackoff Pseudo-Random Permutations. In Advances in Cryptology
EUROCRYPT’03, Warsaw, Poland, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2656, pp. 544–561, Springer-Verlag, 2003.
47. S. Moriai, S. Vaudenay On the Pseudorandomness of Top-Level Schemes of Block Ciphers. In Advances in Cryptology ASI-
ACRYPT’00, Kyoto, Japan, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1976, pp. 289–302, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
48. S. Murphy, F. Piper, M. Walker, P. Wild. Likelihood Estimation for Block Cipher Keys. Unpublished.
49. M. Naor, O. Reingold. On the Construction of Pseudorandom Permutations: Luby-Rackoff Revisited. Journal of Cryptology,
vol. 12, pp. 29–66, 1999.
50. K. Nyberg. Perfect Nonlinear ( -Boxes. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’91, Brighton, United Kingdom, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 547, pp. 378–385, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
51. K. Nyberg, L. R. Knudsen. Provable Security against a Differential Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’94,
Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 839, pp. 566–574, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
52. K. Nyberg, L. R. Knudsen. Provable Security against a Differential Cryptanalysis. Journal of Cryptology, vol. 8, pp. 27–37,
1995.
53. S. Park, S. H. Sung, S. Chee, E-J. Yoon, J. Lim On the Security of Rijndael-Like Structures against Differential and Linear
Cryptanalysis. In Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT’02, Queenstown, New Zeland, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
2501, pp. 176–191, Springer-Verlag, 2002.
54. S. Park, S. H. Sung, S. Lee, J. Lim Improving the Upper Bound on the Maximum Differential and Maximum Linear Hull
Probability for SPN Structures and AES. To appear in FSE’03.
55. J. Patarin. Etude des Ge´ne´rateurs de Permutations Base´s sur le Sche´ma du D.E.S., The`se de Doctorat de l’Universite´ de Paris
6, 1991.
56. J. Patarin. About Feistel Schemes with Six (or More) Rounds. In Fast Software Encryption’98, Paris, France, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 1372, pp. 103–121, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
57. G. Poupard, S. Vaudenay. Decorrelated Fast Cipher: an AES Candidate well suited for Low Cost Smart Cards Applications. In
CARDIS’98, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1820, pp. 254–264, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
58. A. Re´nyi. Probability Theory, Elsevier, 1970.
59. C. E. Shannon. Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems. Bell system technical journal, vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
60. A. Tardy-Corfdir, H. Gilbert. A Known Plaintext Attack of FEAL-4 and FEAL-6. In Advances in Cryptology CRYPTO’91,
Santa Barbara, California, U.S.A., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 576, pp. 172–181, Springer-Verlag, 1992.
61. S. Vaudenay. La Se´curite´ des Primitives Cryptographiques, The`se de Doctorat de l’Universite´ de Paris 7, Technical Report
LIENS-95-10 of the Laboratoire d’Informatique de l’Ecole Normale Supe´rieure, 1995.
62. S. Vaudenay. An Experiment on DES — Statistical Cryptanalysis. In 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, New Delhi, India, pp. 139–147, ACM Press, 1996.
63. S. Vaudenay. A cheap Paradigm for Block Cipher Security Strengthening. Technical Report LIENS-97-3, 1997.
25
64. S. Vaudenay. Provable Security for Block Ciphers by Decorrelation. In STACS’98, Paris, France, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1373, pp. 249–275, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
65. S. Vaudenay. Feistel Ciphers with )LÃ -Decorrelation. In Selected Areas in Cryptography’98, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 1556, pp. 1–14, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
66. S. Vaudenay. The Decorrelation Technique Home-Page.
URL:http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/decorrelation.shtml
67. S. Vaudenay. Resistance Against General Iterated Attacks. In Advances in Cryptology EUROCRYPT’99, Prague, Czech Re-
public, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1592, pp. 255–271, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
68. S. Vaudenay. On the Lai-Massey Scheme. In Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT’99, Singapore, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science 1716, pp. 8–19, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
69. S. Vaudenay. Adaptive-Attack Norm for Decorrelation and Super-Pseudorandomness. In Selected Areas in Cryptography’99,
Kingston, Ontario, Canada, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1758, pp. 49–61, Springer-Verlag, 2000.
70. S. Vaudenay. On Provable Security for Conventional Cryptography. Invited talk. In Information Security and Cryptology
ICISC’99, Seoul, Korea, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1787, pp. 1–16, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
71. G. S. Vernam. Cipher Printing Telegraph Systems for Secret Wire and Radio Telegraphic communications. Journal of the
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, vol. 45, pp. 109–115, 1926.
72. D. Wagner. The Boomerang Attack. In Fast Software Encryption’99, Roma, Italy, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1636,
pp. 156–170, Springer-Verlag, 1999.
73. M. N. Wegman, J. L. Carter. New Hash Functions and their Use in Authentication and Set Equality. Journal of Computer and
System Sciences, vol. 22, pp. 265–279, 1981.
A Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. We consider the best adaptive distinguisher Y between | and |~} . Without loss of generality we can assume
that it is deterministic and it never asks the same query twice. Let q~	æI3q 4 ^_+_a^M;q è 4  , Ł	  4 ^+_+_^ Q  , and
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 . Let Y be the set of accepted  by the distinguisher. The decorrelation distance is simply twice its
advantage, hence
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So we only need to count the number of  so that * |%6
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and Ò	º2=43^_+__^3 Q  . We have  q 	 q ¬~
T
; so  is a lift of  . If
 is unreached, it means that none of its lift are reached. We can thus map at least one (unreached) W in an injective
way to any unreached  multi-point. Hence we have at least v  unreached multi-points  by the ç 4 ^+_+_^Mç Q   
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mapping. We notice that this mapping has no collision: if ç 	æç 4 ^+_+a^Mç Q  and ç 
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B On Super-Pseudorandomness
Super-pseudorandomness addresses the distinguishability of random permutations with distinguishers which can sub-
mit inputs or outputs to the oracle and get the corresponding output or input in return. Fig. 8 depicts a general dis-
tinguisher limited to G queries which are either chosen inputs or chosen outputs. For completeness we state here the
results without a proof.
Parameters: functions B C %ÂÂÂ3%DBFE , a set G
Oracle: permutations H and H O C
1: select a fixed direction and message +*fCZ%D+
Í
C
ÅKBXCF2 and get + C
C
ÅJHﬂ2+
Í
C
 if *^CLÅ$ﬁ or + C
C
ÅJH
O
C
2+
Í
C
 otherwise
2: calculate a direction and a message +* Ã %D+
Í
Ã
ÅKB Ã 2+
C
C
 and get + C
Ã
ÅJHﬀ2+
Í
Ã
 if * Ã Å$ﬁ or + C
Ã
ÅJH
O
C
2+
Í
Ã
 otherwise
3: ÂÂÂ
4: calculate a direction and a message +* Ee%|+
Í
E
)ÅBFEe2+
C
C
%ÂÂÂZ%|+
C
EFO
C
 and get + C
E
Å,Hﬂ2+
Í
E
 if * E9Åﬁ or + C
E
Å,H
O
C
2+
Í
E

otherwise
5: if 2+ C
C
%ÂÂÂZ%D+
C
E
³P[G , output 1, otherwise output 0
Fig. 8. A General R -Limited Distinguisher with Chosen Inputs or Outputs.
In the same way that we dene the tut¨©tut { norm with Equation (4), we dene a tutÀﬂtzt×á norm on N0¢¤£3l ¢¤£ by
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We can transform the matrix i into a matrix 2i on
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Then we have tut iytzt á 	ºtzt32i~tzt { . We easily deduce that
– tutÀﬂtut á is actually a matrix norm,
– we have tutzt iﬃtutzt wï¾tut iytzt {ﬃ¾tut iytzt á for any i ,
– the following equivalent of Theorem 9 holds.
Theorem 29 ([69]). Let G be an integer and let
 
be a cipher. The best G -limited distinguisher (as depicted in Fig. 8)
for   is such that
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where
 
} is the perfect cipher.
The equivalent of Lemma 22 is as follows.
Lemma 30 ([70]). Let G be an integer. Let
 
be a random permutation on a set
P
. We let  be the subset of P Q of
all  4 ^__+a^ Q  with pairwise different entries. We let   } be a uniformly distributed random permutation on P . We
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Lemma 19 can also be stated in terms of super-pseudorandomness.
Lemma 31 (Luby-Rackoff [40]). Let | 4 ^| / ^M|

^|

be four independent uniformly distributed random functions on
P
 and let G be an integer. We consider the cipher
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outputs, we have
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The consequence is the following equivalent of Theorem 21.
Theorem 32 ([69]). Let | 4 ^_+_+^M|
â
be å independent random functions on P  such that tutz* |¹q6 QU· * |Ò}6 Q tut {ﬃ¾ : ( oL	
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Finally, Theorem 25 extends as follows.
Theorem 33. Let
 
be a cipher in the PEANUT family with parameters ´^Må3^MG^ ð  . We have
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where
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} is the perfect cipher.
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